

VAL-4 B- 1972
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LIGHT ATTACK SQUADRON FOUR
Fleet Post Office
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VAL-4:343:abz
5750
Ser 17
5 APRIL 1972

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(Unclassified upon removal of enclosures)

From: Commanding Officer, Light Attack Squadron FOUR
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05D2)

Subj: Light Attack Squadron FOUR Command History for 1971,
(Report Symbol 5750-1); submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST 5750.12B

Encl: (1) Basic History
(2) Statistical Summary 1 January 1971 through
10 April 1972
(3) Significant Combat Actions period 1 January 1971
to 10 April 1972
(4) Commendations of Action

1. In accordance with reference (a), Command History for
Light Attack Squadron FOUR for the period 1 January 1971
through 10 April 1972 is submitted.

H. W. Porter
H. W. PORTER Acting

Copy to:
Director of Naval History

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED - Article 0445
OPNAVINST 5510.10, by
OP-09B91C, 25 OCT 72

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HISTORICAL SUMMARY

1. Basic History.

a. Commanding Officers and dates of command occurring during calendar year 1971, and first quarter of 1972, were as follows:

(1) CDR Leonard M. RAUSCH, USN, 402679/1310, 3 September 1970 through 3 March 1971. Commander Leonard M. RAUSCH, the son of Mr. and Mrs. Marcene RAUSCH, was born 26 January 1929 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Coming from a Navy family, he enlisted in the Navy and advanced to Guided Missileman First Class before being selected for Officer Candidate School. He was commissioned an Ensign in September 1955 and received his wings upon completion of flight training in December 1956.

From January 1957 to January 1961, Commander RAUSCH served with Anti-Submarine Squadron TWENTY THREE and while embarked aboard the USS PRINCETON (CVS-37) participated in the Quemoy-Matsu crises in the Taiwan Straits. He was then assigned to Attack Squadron-126, Detachment ALFA, at the ASW Weapons Delivery Center.

In January 1964, Commander RAUSCH reported to the USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) as Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer where he served until June 1966. He then reported to Air Anti-Submarine Squadron TWENTY FIVE. While embarked on the USS YORKTOWN (CVS-10), VS-25 participated in Formation Star during the Pueblo incident of January 1968. He was detached from VS-25 in September 1968 and reported to the Plans and Programs Division of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Operations and Readiness where he served until receiving orders to Light Attack Squadron FOUR as Executive Officer in March 1970.

He is married to the former Martinette Bakke of San Francisco, California. Commander and Mrs. RAUSCH are the parents of a daughter, Lynette, and a son, David.

Commander RAUSCH wears the following medals: Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Unit Commendation, Good Conduct Award, Navy Occupation Medal, National Defense Service

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Downgraded 1 or 3 year~~
~~intervals; declassified~~
~~after 12 years~~

Enclosure (1)

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[REDACTED]

Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with star, Vietnamese Service Medal with six stars, the Vietnamese Campaign Medal, the Vietnamese First Class Honor Medal and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.

(2) CDR Robert W. PORTER, USN, 040 28 0939, 3 March 1971 to the present. Commander Robert W. PORTER, the son of Mr. and Mrs. Wesley E. PORTER of Old Saybrook, Connecticut, was born on 20 March 1934 in New Britain, Connecticut. He entered the Navy in July 1955 as a Naval Aviation Cadet, and commissioned an Ensign and designated a Naval Aviator upon completion of flight training in December 1956.

Immediately after receiving his wings, Commander PORTER reported to Fighter Squadron SIXTY TWO, where he was assigned until 1960. He then reported to the Naval Air Technical Training Command at Glynco, Georgia, as a Radar Intercept Officer Instructor for the newly developed F-4 Phantom program.

In March 1963, Commander PORTER was ordered to the USS ENTERPRISE as a Catapult Officer and participated in "Operation Sea Orbit," the first circumnavigation of the world by a nuclear task force. In March 1967, he was graduated from the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in International Relations. At this time he joined Fighter Squadron EIGHTY FOUR and served as Administrative Officer and Operations Officer, flying the F-4J Phantom.

In January 1970, he was ordered to the Armed Forces Staff College from which he graduated in July 1970, after receiving orders to Light Attack Squadron FOUR.

He is married to the former Janis Lyon Frain of Essex, Connecticut. Commander and Mrs. PORTER have three children; Laural, Robert and Anne.

Commander PORTER wears the following medals: Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross (2), Individual Air Medal (3), Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V", Combat Action Ribbon, National Defense Service Medal, Vietnamese Service Medal, Vietnamese Campaign Medal, and the Vietnamese Army Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star (2).

[REDACTED]

Enclosure (3)

[REDACTED]

b. Missions and functions which have changed since previous annual Historical Summary submitted:

(1) The mission of Light Attack Squadron FOUR remains to support the counter-insurgency effort of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force by providing close air support to riverine units of the U. S. and Vietnamese Navys as well as providing air support to other friendly forces when requested by appropriate authority.

2. Summary of Operations. During calendar year 1971 and first quarter of 1972, Light Attack Squadron FOUR provided air support for the following operations:

a. Tran Hung Dao Missions I, II, IV, VI, VIII, IX, X, X/II, XVIII, XX, and XXI from 1 January 1971 to 12 July 1971.

(1) These missions were flown throughout various areas of the Mekong Delta, in support of the Navy Riverine units within the area. Several of these operations were ended prior to 12 July, and several others were combined to form new patrol areas. Tran Hung Dao's involved cover missions for convoys transiting hostile waters, and were primarily concerned with denying the enemy the use of waterways in order to stop known infiltration into an area. Many of the specific missions of these operations have been discussed in previous Command History Reports.

(2) On 12 July 1971, VAL-4 ceased flying Tran Hung Dao patrols. One reason was that all of the U. S. "Brown Water" Navy assets had been turned over to the Vietnamese, therefore daily U. S. air patrols were not required. Another factor was that Light Attack Squadron FOUR could better utilize its assets in support of the Riverine Forces and ARVN Forces in the form of random patrols, producing a quick reactionary airborne force for support of any unit in the Delta as well as maintaining a 24 hour a day scramble capability. Consequently, several other missions for the squadron were adopted.

b. Cover missions for ARVN supply vessels, with continuous on station flight.

(1) These missions were usually flown in support of VN Navy boats transiting hostile waterways to deliver supplies

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to the command posts of the various VN Army Divisions in the Delta. Secondly, overhead coverage was provided in the Binh Thuy-Can Tho area during periods of high threat of enemy attack on these positions.

(2) The result of these airborne cover missions has been undeniably successful. Very few Navy convoys have been attacked since VAL-4 has been providing cover, and the Binh Thuy-Can Tho area has not come under attack during the periods of overhead cover. Approximately 20% of all missions flown from 1 January 1971 to 10 April 1972 were cover missions.

c. Random Patrols.

(1) The missions were normally two-hour patrols flown in support of any unit in the Delta Region that may have required air assets. Following release from CTF 116, the section is free to check in with various Provinces, ARVN units and VN Navy units to determine where air assets are needed.

(2) Approximately 65% of all missions flown from 1 January 1971 to 10 April 1972 were random patrols in support of various ARVN units and VN Navy units in the Delta Region. Approximately 95% of these missions were flown in support of ARVN units.

d. Visual Airborne Reconnaissance Surveillance (VARS).

(1) This mission, established on 8 September 1971, was originally designed for two reasons:

(a) To keep an account of the Market Time activities along the coastline from Ha Tien to Vung Tau. The mission was established in order to check on operations performed by the Market Time to ensure that their mission was being carried out.

(b) Vector Market Time vessels to waterborne craft that were violating no-boat zones, or to inspect suspicious looking watercraft in order to prevent enemy infiltration of supplies.

(2) From 8 September 1971 to 10 April 1972, approximately 225 VARS missions were flown by VAL-4, of which 160 were along the coast of the U-Minh Forest. A pilot flies in the front seat, while an air observer from CTF 116 flies in the rear seat, gathering the information needed.

e. Preplanned Strikes.

(1) These strikes generally took the form of a CBU-55 FAE preplanned strike. The strike request and information are originated by the Delta Regional Assistance Command, stationed at Can Tho. These strikes were normally used to clear an area of booby traps, mines, bunkers, and personnel prior to an ARVN sweep or insert.

(2) First used in May 1971, the CBU-55 FAE has proven to be an extremely effective weapon in deterring the enemy. More information concerning this mission can be found later in this report under the development of new weapons in the squadron.

f. Naval Gun Fire.

(1) This mission, performed by a single aircraft, involved working with various ships off the coast of the Delta Region, both on the East Coast and West Coast. This mission is flown with a pilot in the front seat, and First ANGLICO Air observer in the rear seat. VAL-4 generally supplied one to two Naval Gun fire missions per day in support of the ARVN troops.

g. "U-Minh Campaign." 4 September 1971-22 September 1971.

(1) Of special significance during calendar year 1971 were the operations of VAL-4 in support of the 21st ARVN Division in the "U-Minh Campaign," designed as an offensive thrust against the traditional Viet Cong stronghold in the U-Minh Forest. Undeniably contributing to the Allied success of the campaign, VAL-4 flew 218 sorties (110 sorties scrambled) in the week of 14 to 21 September, the apex of the campaign. In that week, VAL-4 was responsible for 114 confirmed enemy KBA, 217 probable KBA and 254 possible KBA. The monthly statistics can be found in enclosure (2) of this report. During the campaign, only three Black Pony aircraft sustained battle damage, and no personnel losses were incurred by the command.

h. Rung Sat Special Zone Cover.

(1) On 25 February 1972, Light Attack Squadron FOUR was assigned the responsibility for the overhead cover of all U. S. Navy and U. S. merchant vessels transiting the Saigon

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River in the Rung Sat Special Zone. These missions were flown in support of CTF 115. Generally, six sorties per day were used in support of this mission.

3. Introduction and development of new weapons and tactics to Light Attack Squadron FOUR.

a. The MK63 five inch rocket warhead was introduced to the squadron in May 1971. This warhead, designed to be used only with a close proximity fuze, greatly increased the squadron's anti-personnel capability. The fragmentation pattern of the MK63 warhead has greatly increased the effective kill radius of the weapon. The tactics employed using this weapon are basically the same as when using the MK32 warhead with a close proximity fuze.

b. The CBU-55 FAE weapon was introduced to the squadron in December 1970, but was not extensively used until May 1971. The CBU-55 is a cluster bomb unit, free fall, parachute stabilized, fuel-air explosive weapon. Due to the high over pressure produced in the detonation of this weapon, the CBU-55 has been an ideal weapon against well-entrenched, well-bunkered personnel, for troop insertion preparations, and for clearing an area of booby traps and mines. Prior to receiving the CBU-55, VAL-4 had employed only forward firing ordnance. Upon receipt of this weapon, new tactics were devised and modified as more experience and knowledge were gained. This allowed the aircraft to carry four 5 inch rockets, two under each wing, plus four M-60 machine guns with ammunition. It was found that the most accurate delivery method was a level drop at about 800 feet AGL, 180-230 KIAS, with a one second time delay on the fuze. Although deliveries were made up to a 45° dive angle, and 2800 feet release altitude, the accuracy was far less than a level low altitude drop due mainly to the wind effect on the weapon. Briefings were presented to Delta Regional Assistant Command and Third Regional Assistant Command as to its capability and proper targeting. The weapon proved highly successful.

c. GPU-2, 20mm gun pod. Since receiving this weapon into the squadron in December 1970 (but was not used extensively until mid-1971), VAL-4 has met with limited success in the operational effectiveness of the weapon. Due to the design of the feed mechanism and the vibration produced by the gun, and other mechanical problems, the gun has been prone to jam. Reliability was approximately 25% of all GPU-2s.

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d. The United States Marine Corps acquired a complete new weapons system in the YOY-10D aircraft equipped with FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red) and a turret mounted, multiple barreled 20mm gun.

(1) It was decided to conduct the combat evaluation of the new system at Binh Thuy, RVN in conjunction with VAL-4, from 1 June to 13 August 1971. VAL-4 provided ramp and hangar spaces, supply and maintenance assistance as well as combining the Marine Corps YOY-10D and Navy OV-10As into an efficient and deadly attack team. New tactics were developed to utilize the FLIR system of the YOY-10D in conjunction with the ordnance carried by the OV-10D. Again, ground commanders in Military Regions IV and III were briefed on a new weapons system. VAL-4's scheduled flight operations were increased from 17 hours per day to 24 hours per day to take advantage of the outstanding night capabilities of the YOY-10D. The combination of the real time detection capability of the FLIR, the target marking by the 20mm projectile used by the YOY-10D proved to be a deadly weapon against enemy operations in remote areas under the cover of darkness.

(2) The compliment of Marine aircraft on board VAL-4 consisted of two (2) YOY-10D aircraft and three Marine flight crews to man them. Thirteen (13) additional Marine enlisted personnel were assigned to the command for maintenance support.

(3) There were several combinations of weapons delivery techniques under study by the Marine Detachment. These consisted of the following:

- (a) One OV-10A flying wing on one YOY-10D.
- (b) One YOY-10D working with two OV-10As.
- (c) Two YOY-10D flying in section.

e. During the calendar year 1971, new patrol and delivery tactics for the squadron were developed. The development of these new tactics has been directly responsible for the reduced number of damaged aircraft and personnel loss while on target.


(1) Killer Wing - This wing position is flown at a 45° zone aft of the leader, at 40 to 400 feet. It is generally flown with step-up and on bearing. The purpose for this

position is twofold. One is to maintain the integrity of the section. The second is for more protection of the lead and wing aircrafts while on target.

(2) The Wagon Wheel tactic has been adopted by the squadron to reduce the susceptibility of the aircraft to enemy fire while on target. This tactic is discussed in basic attack tactics manuals, and therefore will not be discussed in this report.

(3) Minimum altitude pull outs were established for the different weapons used, as well as the minimum distance from friendlies for the delivery of various weapons. Minimum altitude pull outs were determined from the fragmentation patterns of the particular weapon - 1700 feet for a proximity fuze 5 inch Zuni rocket; 1500 feet for point detonating 5 inch Zuni rockets and all 2.75 inch rockets. The minimum safe distances from friendly units when using the various weapons were also established by the fragmentation pattern of the weapon, and the inherent inaccuracy of a particular weapon. They are as follows:

- 100 meters for a LAU 61 or LAU 69
- 50 meters for LAU 68
- 60 meters for proximity fuze 5 inch Zuni rocket
- 50 meters for a point detonating 5 inch Zuni rocket
- 10 meters for strafe
- 500 meters for a CBU-55 FAE bomb



1. The following is a month by month summary of Light Attack Squadron FOUR statistics for the year 1971.

a. Expenditures.

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FLT.HRS.</u>	<u>ZUNIS</u>	<u>2.75"</u>	<u>7.62MM</u>	<u>20MM</u>	<u>FLARES</u>	<u>CBU-5</u>
January	606	1335	3492	7279	347,060	3693	840	0
February	549	1155	3330	6120	408,063	2759	726	0
March	540	1284	2863	4725	339,200	4684	496	0
April	518	1149	2530	4414	321,650	7400	312	0
May	565	1129	2671	6466	296,000	5470	300	43
June	619	1334	3585	4708	260,589	42,016	229	23
July	685	1342	3915	4762	217,778	77,931	242	78
August	556	1127	3092	4546	163,857	31,633	314	54
September	616	1171	4379	5391	222,925	6,128	490	111
October	571	1057	4299	5463	166,910	6,727	467	96
November	571	1023	1628	7270	104,949	4,924	246	133
December	<u>608</u>	<u>1144</u>	<u>2834</u>	<u>4126</u>	<u>179,375</u>	<u>4,456</u>	<u>405</u>	<u>217</u>
Total	7,004	14,250	38,618	65,270	3,028,356	197,821	5,067	755

NOTE 1: Weapons used by VAL-4 in year 1971 were: 5" FFAR Zuni, 2.75" FFAR, 7.62MM M-60 Machine Gun, 20MM Cannon, MK-45 Flare, and the CBU-55 FAE bomb.

NOTE 2: During the months of June, July, and August, the YOV-10Ds were using a turret mounted, multiple barreled 20mm gun, which accounts for the high number of 20mm rounds expended for those months.


Enclosure (2)

GROUP 4

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b. Bomb Damage Assessments.

	<u>KEA</u>	<u>Structures</u> <u>Dam/Dest</u>	<u>Bunkers</u> <u>Dam/Dest</u>	<u>Sampans</u> <u>Dam/Dest</u>	<u>Secondary</u> <u>Explosion</u>
January	209	36/49	15/30	4/17	20
February	238	26/116	14/112	6/48	38
March	207	26/89	15/38	0/44	50
April	229	39/118	16/114	0/47	27
May	206	18/57	6/67	2/16	18
June	229	34/111	0/57	10/76	9
July	228	32/65	86/135	30/55	37
August	119	45/90	103/177	2/19	45
September	324	41/110	16/63	0/1	21
October	277	2/17	10/9	0/8	1
November	41	0/24	0/18	0/7	4
December	<u>118</u>	<u>0/113</u>	<u>0/190</u>	<u>0/9</u>	<u>14</u>
Totals:	2,425	299/959	281/1,010	54/347	284

Other: April - One (1) 168 ft. NVA SL-8 Trawler was destroyed.

Summary of VAL-4 losses for the year 1971:

Personnel wounded in action: 1

Personnel killed in action: 0

Aircraft lost due to enemy fire: 1

3. The following is a statistical summary of the U. S. Marine Corps Detachment with VAL-4, using the YOY-10ⁿ aircraft from 5 June to 13 August 1971:

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Total missions flown:	207
Enemy killed by air:	275
Enemy wounded by air:	23
Sampans destroyed:	63
Sampans damaged:	30
Structures destroyed:	14
Structures damaged:	39
Secondary fires:	19
Secondary explosions:	36
Bunkers destroyed:	7
Bunkers damaged:	19
Supply caches damaged/destroyed:	4

Of special interest is the fact that on two occasions, the Marine aircraft were directly responsible for the saving of an outpost under heavy attack.

4. The following is a month by month summary of Light Attack Squadron FOUR from 1 January 1972 to 31 March 1972.

a. Expenditures.

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FLT.HRS.</u>	<u>ZUNIS</u>	<u>2.75"</u>	<u>7.62MM</u>	<u>20MM</u>	<u>FLARES</u>	<u>CBU-55</u>
January	697	1267	2342	6470	222,676	3887	574	196
February	770	1344	3508	6485	242,100	2916	649	99
March	<u>582</u>	<u>1130</u>	<u>3934</u>	<u>2268</u>	<u>135,200</u>	<u>2560</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>149</u>
Total :	2049	3741	9784	15223	599,976	9363	1385	444

b. Bomb Damage Assessments.

	<u>KBA</u>	<u>STRUCTURES DAM/DEST.</u>	<u>BUNKERS DAM/DEST.</u>	<u>SAMPANS DAM/DEST.</u>	<u>2ND EXPLOSION</u>
January	99	2/68	0/102	6/30	15
February	55	3/113	4/228	3/29	8
March	<u>67</u>	<u>1/3</u>	<u>4/36</u>	<u>0/12</u>	<u>21</u>
Totals:	221	6/184	4/366	9/71	44

SIGNIFICANT COMBAT ACTIONS

1 January 1971 through 31 March 1972

- 1 January A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to assist an outpost of the 21st ARVN Division which was under heavy enemy fire and 82mm mortar attack, and was in grave danger of being overrun. Without the aid of illumination, and only the enemy fire directed at them to guide them after the friendly strobe and machine gun tracers failed, the Ponies placed their strike, silencing the enemy fire. The flight was credited with 35 VC/NVA KBA and saving the outpost.
- 6 January The Ponies were scrambled in support of U. S. and ARVN troops pinned down by intense enemy fire. Although receiving intense enemy fire throughout their attack, the flight was credited with 24 VC/NVA KBA.
- 22 January While on a normal interdiction patrol, the Ponies were diverted to place a strike in support of a Navy SEAL team which was attacked while being extracted from an enemy area. The SEAL team came under heavy enemy fire as the Ponies began their strike. The Ponies silenced all enemy fire, killed four enemy and were credited with saving the SEAL team.
- 9 February On a routine interdiction patrol, a Light Attack Fire Team was diverted to place a strike in support of a VN Navy unit under enemy attack by B-40 rocket and heavy automatic weapons fire. The Ponies were then directed to an area where two Army helos had been downed by enemy fire and the ground force attempting to reach the crash scene were in heavy contact with the enemy. After placing their strike, a second Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to assist. In all, the Ponies accounted for 20 VC/NVA KBA.
- 17 February A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to support an ARVN outpost under enemy attack. After placing their strike, the flight rearmed and

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were returning to the outpost when they were diverted to place a strike in support of ARVN troops in contact with a company of VC. After placing their strike in support of the ARVN unit, they again rearmed and returned to the outpost to place a second strike there. The Ponies were credited with 24 VC/NVA KBA.

13 March

A Light Attack Fire Team scrambled to assist an ARVN unit under attack by a company of Viet Cong. After placing a strike which resulted in 9 VC/NVA KBA, the Ponies provided cover for a MEDEVAC helo removing the ARVN wounded.

22 March

A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to an area where five Army helicopters had been shot down in the previous twelve hours. The Pony strikes killed 11 enemy and destroyed one .51 caliber machine gun and one 61mm mortar which were captured by ARVN troops.

1 April

Ponies were scrambled to assist an Army spotter aircraft and ARVN troops in contact with VC bunkers while ground troops were conducting a sweep. Ponies were credited by a later sweep with 15 VC/NVA KBA, 1 bunker destroyed and three .51 caliber machine guns destroyed.

8 April

Ponies placed a strike for a U. S. Army night observation aircraft on an enemy supply route. The flight destroyed six heavily laden sampans and killed twelve enemy troops.

11 April

A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled by CTF 116 to assist CTF 115 units (Market Time) which were in pursuit of an NVA SL-8 infiltration trawler. Upon clearance to fire at the trawler which had been engaged in a running sea battle with four USN Market Time vessels and two VNN gunboats, the Ponies commenced a series of rocket attacks, receiving intense 23mm and .51 caliber fire. After several direct hits with point detonating rockets, the trawler was in an uncontrollable left turn surrounded by an 800 foot oil slick. Minutes after the Ponies left the target to rearm, the trawler sank.

[REDACTED]

23 April

[REDACTED]

On a scramble to An Xuyen Province, a Light Attack Fire Team placed a strike on a .51 caliber machine gun site which had shot down two Army helicopters. Copilots on the flight were RADM WITTMAN and Captain FOSS.

1. May

Ponies were scrambled to assist an Army CAVPAC in contact with 100 Viet Cong equipped with heavy automatic weapons and occupying fortified positions in a bunker complex. In spite of the heavy automatic weapons fire received on target, the flight killed eleven enemy troops.

22 May

On a scramble to Kien Giang Province, a Light Attack Fire Team placed a strike for the 31st Regiment, 21st ARVN Division which was in contact with the enemy. In spite of intense .51 caliber machine gun fire, which was silenced by the strike, the flight was credited with 28 VC/NVA KBA.

23 May

Two Light Attack Fire Teams were scrambled in support of ARVN troops in Kien Giang Province in contact with two reinforced platoons of Viet Cong equipped with B-40 rockets, automatic weapons and small arms. The enemy occupied fortified positions on a mountain slope, Ponies drove the enemy from the mountain, causing many enemy casualties and saving the ARVN unit from being overrun.

23 May 71

A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to assist a Vietnamese outpost in Kien Phong Province. The outpost was receiving small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. Of the two U. S. Army Advisors, one had been killed and the other wounded in the enemy attack. The perimeter of the outpost had been penetrated by the enemy, the outpost was in flames and in grave danger of being overrun. The Ponies strikes silenced all enemy fire, and they then placed their remaining ordnance on the enemy's line of retreat. The flight remained to provide illumination and directions for MEDEVAC helos which removed the wounded U. S. and ARVNs. The Black Ponies were credited with saving the outpost from being overrun.

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1 June On first NOGS patrol, the Ponies placed a strike for U. S. Army spotter aircraft on a VC staging area. Two camouflaged sampans were destroyed and two enemy were killed.

4 June On a scramble to Choung Thien Province, the Ponies placed a strike for an outpost that was under attack from an unknown sized force, using 57mm recoilless rifles and B-40s. Receiving 12. mm anti-aircraft fire, the Ponies placed a second strike. The flight was credited with 24 VC/NVA KBA and for saving the outpost from being overrun.

22 June On a scramble to An Xuyen Province, the Ponies placed a strike for the ARVN 4th Rangers who were in heavy contact with an estimated company of VC/NVA. The flight received intense automatic weapons and .51 caliber anti-aircraft fire, and after expending all ordnance, returned to home base, rearmed and returned to place another strike, resulting in 13 VC/NVA KBA.

22 June On a scramble to Bac Lieu Province, the Ponies placed a strike for an Army forward air controller. When the Ponies asked friendly units to mark their position with smoke, the enemy unit also marked with smoke, but the wrong color. After placing a strike on the enemy smoke, the flight was credited with 13 VC/NVA KBA.

9 July Three Light Attack Fire Teams were scrambled to assist the 31st Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division, which was in heavy contact with enemy elements, receiving heavy automatic weapons fire and B-40 rocket fire. Following the strike, the enemy fire ceased, 22 VC/NVA were KBA, and the enemy forces were routed.

24 July Three Light Attack Fire Teams scrambled to Choung Thien Province to support the 31st Regiment, 21st ARVN Division, which was in heavy contact with two companies of VC/NVA. The flights received intense ground fire. The strikes resulted in 7 VC/NVA KBA, and saving many friendly lives.

29 July While on patrol with YOV-10D NOGS in Choung Thien Province, the Ponies placed a strike on VC/NVA positions in preparation for helicopter troop inserts, resulting in 9 VC/NVA KBA.

- [REDACTED]
- 11 August On an airborne scramble to assist the 968 RF Company receiving heavy ground fire and 82mm mortar and rocket bombardment from a treeline, the Ponies placed a strike, controlled on target by a Seawolf Command and Control helicopter (Navy). The friendly troops reported 24 VC/NVA KBA and the capture of 82mm mortars upon completion of the strike.
- 30 August While on patrol in Vinh Binh Province, the Ponies placed a strike on VC/NVA bunker positions, resulting in two bunkers destroyed, three structures damaged and one destroyed, two secondary explosions and seven VC/NVA KBA.
- 1 September On a random patrol to Vinh Binh Province, the Ponies placed a strike for an Army forward air controller, on a known Viet Cong stronghold. A second strike followed, and results of the two strikes were 22 VC/NVA KBA plus considerable damage to the Viet Cong war supplies.
- 15 September On four separate flights scrambled to Kien Giang Province, the Black Ponies placed their strikes for the 33rd Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division, which was in heavy contact and receiving intense machine gun and mortar fire. The air strikes were credited with seven VC/NVA KBA and saving many friendly lives.
- 16 September On a scramble to Kien Giang Province, the Ponies placed a strike on the western side of the 33rd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division's command post which was being held up in the eastern side of the command post only a few meters away and the flight received intense ground fire. The air strike resulted in the capture of a B-40 rocket launcher and six VC/NVA KBA, and saved the the outpost from being overrun.
- 17 September A flight of two Ponies were scrambled to assist the 33rd Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division in Kien Giang Province, which was in heavy contact with the enemy. Results of the strike were 21 VC/NVA KBA.

- [REDACTED]
- 17 September In two strikes placed for the 33rd Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division, the Ponies attacked a known Viet Cong position and two .51 caliber sites. The results of the strike were 34 VC/NVA KBA.
- 20 September Three Light Attack Fire Teams scrambled to Kien Giang Province to assist the 33rd Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division, an element of which was pinned down and unable to move due to the intense enemy ground fire. The strike was credited with 20 VC/NVA KBA, numerous weapons captured, and saving the friendly elements from possible disaster.
- 21 September On a scramble to An Xuyen Province, the Ponies placed a strike for the 31st Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division. The target was a known enemy position which had just shot down an Army helicopter. After two strikes, the flight was credited with 45 VC/NVA KBA.
- 23 September On a scramble to Kien Giang Province, the Ponies placed a strike for the ARVN 4th Rangers, who were in heavy contact with an estimated company of VC/NVA. Results of the strike were 10 VC/NVA KBA.
- 29 September On a patrol to Vinh Binh Province, the Ponies placed a strike on VC/NVA bunker complexes, resulting in four bunkers destroyed, seven structures destroyed, three structures damaged and seven VC/NVA KBA.
- 14 October On a special mission to Cambodia, three Light Attack Fire Teams placed a preplanned CBU strike. The result of the air strike was 52 VC/NVA KBA.
- 29 October On the coast of Vinh Binh Province, while prosecuting a target, a crew ejected from their aircraft when it was brought down by enemy fire. The crew escaped serious injury, and were rescued within an hour by an Army helicopter.
- 4 November On a CBU mission to Phong Dinh Province, Ponies placed a strike for ARVN ground units. Results of the strike were 7 VC/NVA KBA.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
16 November

On a patrol to Choung Thien Province, the Ponies placed a strike for the province TOC on a VC/NVA staging area. Results of the strike were 4 VC/NVA KBA, 2 carbines and 1 machinegun captured.

17 December

On an airborne scramble to Kien Hoa Province, the Ponies placed a strike for an outpost that was under attack. They were controlled on target by two Navy helicopters, Seawolf 78 and Seawolf 75. The flight was credited with 9 VC/NVA KBA and saving the outpost.

25 December

On a scramble to Kien Giang Province, Phuc Quoc Island, the Ponies placed a strike in support of U. S. ground troops who were under attack from enemy units who had broken the Christmas truce.

28 December

On a preplanned CBU mission to Phong Dinh Province, Ponies placed a strike for the Province TOC. Controlled on target by the sector advisor in an Army C&C helicopter, the flight was credited with 2 VC/NVA KBA and 50 bunkers destroyed.

13 January 72

On a scramble to An Xuyen Province, the Ponies placed a strike for the 32nd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division, controlled on target by one of their ground elements. Results of the strike were 10 VC/NVA KBA.

21 January

On a scramble to An Xuyen Province, a flight of Ponies placed a strike for an element of the 32nd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division in heavy contact with a VC/NVA unit. Results of the strike included 3 VC/NVA KBA, 5 bunkers destroyed, 1 M-1 rifle captured, and 16 sampans destroyed.

23 January

On a patrol to Dinh Tuong Province, the Ponies placed a strike for the 11th RCAT of the 9th ARVN Division, on a known enemy location. Controlled by one of the ARVN ground elements, the flight was credited with 13 VC/NVA KBA and 5 weapons captured.

- [REDACTED]
- 16 February On an airborne scramble to Vinh Long Province, a Light Attack Fire Team placed a strike for Vung Liem District, on a known VC/NVA position. Controlled on target by an Army C&C helicopter, the flight was credited with destroying 3 structures, 2 bunkers, 17 sampans and 11 foxholes.
- 12 February On a scramble to Vinh Long Province, a Light Attack Fire Team placed a strike for TOC Vinh Long and were controlled on target by an Army C & C helicopter. Friendly forces were pinned down by enemy fire from an unknown number of VC/NVA. The flight was credited with 8 VC/NVA KBA, 3 structures destroyed and allowing the friendly troops to advance.
- 13 February A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to assist the 15th Regiment of the 9th ARVN Division, which was in heavy contact with an element of VC/NVA in Choung Thien Province. A second strike followed, each controlled by VN ground troops. The flights were credited with 6 VC/NVA KBA, 2 B-40s and 7 AK-47s captured.
- 24 February A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to Vinh Long Province to support a friendly force in heavy contact with an element of VC/NVA. A second flight followed with an additional strike, each controlled by an Army C&C helicopters. The flights were credited with 5 VC/NVA KBA and destroying 7 structures, 5 bunkers and 2 sampans.
- 1 March On a preplanned CBU-55 FAE strike mission to Kien Hoa Province, a Light Attack Fire Team placed a strike for Kien Hoa TOC, destroying 13 bunkers, 4 VC/NVA KBA and producing 4 secondary explosions.
- 10 March A series of strikes to An Xuyen Province were launched in support of the 32nd Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division, which was in heavy contact with the enemy. Several of the aircraft received extensive battle damage from the enemy .51 caliber fire. Results of the strikes were 18 VC/NVA KBA.
- 22 March On a random patrol to Kien Hoa Province, a Light Attack Fire Team placed a strike on a VC/NVA bunker/staging complex. A ground sweep following the strike revealed 12 VC/NVA KBA by the flight.

- [REDACTED]
- 28 March A Light Attack Fire Team was scrambled to Kien Phong Province to support an outpost that was under attack. Controlled by ground personnel within the outpost, the flight observed 10 VC/NVA KBA (Probable) and 5 sampans destroyed. They were also credited with saving the outpost from being overrun.
- 31 March VAL-4 launched its last combat mission. A strike was placed in support of the 33rd Regiment, 21st ARVN Division on a VC/NVA concentration of bunkers, sampans and a suspected anti-aircraft site.
- 1 April VAL-4 commenced stand down.
- 4 April Aircraft were launched from VNAF Binh Thuy for Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines, with a refueling stop at Cam Ranh Bay.
- 10 April Light Attack Squadron FOUR officially disestablished.

20 July 1971

From: Senior Advisor, Phu Quoc Special Sector and Naval
Intelligence Liaison Officer, An Thoi
To: Commanding Officer, Light Attack Squadron FOUR
Subj: Letter of Appreciation

1. The Leatherneck-Black Pony team constitute the most accurate and effective weapons delivery system ever employed on Phu Quoc Island. Since the first Leatherneck-Black Pony mission flown over Phu Quoc on 14 July, all missions have had a devastating effect on the island's VC population.

2. The urgent mission on 20 July was instrumental in deterring a planned mortar attack on the village of Duong Dong, the district capital. The prompt response and highly professional conduct of the mission was typical of all Light Attack Squadron FOUR's operations conducted in support of Phu Quoc operations.

3. Worthly of special note is the mission flown on 14 July by First Lieutenant DEARBORN in Leatherneck 56 and Lieutenant (junior grade) CHIPPS in Black Pony 27. At 0150H the team arrived over Phu Quoc on a random patrol. At 0200H, a VC platoon was detected and after proper clearances were obtained, a highly effective strike was placed resulting in six VC killed and five wounded. While over the target, Leatherneck 56 experienced a circuit board fire however First Lieutenant DEARBORN and his crew displayed complete calmness and enterprise in handling the emergency procedures thus not preventing him from placing a highly accurate and devastating strike against the VC position. The crew's exemplary actions in the face of a potential disaster resulted in the highly successful mission and were in the highest traditions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps.

/s/THOMAS N. TURK
Major, U. S. Army

/s/JOHN D. RAUSCH
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy

Enclosure (4)

27 August 1971

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN ALEXANDER S. CASE, U. S. ARMY, 538 48 5882

On 12 February 1971, I, Cpt. A. S. CASE, 538 48 5882, U. S. Army, was Senior Advisor of the 21st ARVN Infantry Division RECON Co. On this date the company was inserted into an LZ in Bien An District, Kien Giang Province. Upon insertion the company came under heavy automatic weapons, small arms, B-40 rocket fire at approximately 1300 H 12 Feb. 1971. I requested Black Ponies already having Air Ca. (Apache Guns) on station. Black Ponies arrived on station, received briefing and began placing air strikes. On all strikes between 1430-1445, the Black Ponies received heavy enemy automatic weapons ground fire while pulling out to altitude. On the first or second strike Black Pony 03 reported, "I see a lot of people running around down there;" this while being shot at. After expending Black Pony 03 returned to base. At approximately 1530 Black Pony 05 returned on station and placed more strikes in the same area. As a result of his first strikes, his second time on target gained negative ground fire. Black Pony efforts, coupled with those of Apache Troop ("A"-7/1 Cav) resulted in twenty-one (21) BAs. Black Pony accounted for seven (7). Intell. reported VC unit as one company plus (100 men) of the 307th Main Force Battalion. My gratitude is extended to VAL-4 (Black Ponies) for their close-in air support and in my estimation and the estimations of my fellow advisors, those pilots are responsible for saving the lives of all the U. S. soldiers in the 21st DIV. FOAR. I know from personal knowledge/experience...I probably wouldn't be alive today if it weren't for Black Pony 03/05 on 12 Feb. 1971.

/s/ALEXANDER S. CASE
CPT. U. S. ARMY

Enclosure (4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ZNY CCCCC

~~F 0100~~
FM CTF TWO ONE EIGHT
TO RUMUJLS/CDR FOURTEENTH ARVN REGIMENT
RUMJNO/USDAO PHNOM PENH
RUMRSA/CG SEVENTH AIR FORCE
RUMUJLS/NINTH DIV DCAT SIX ZERO, FWD, CHI LANG
RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX PT EIGHT
RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT SEVEN
RUMUJLS/CG NINTH ARVN DIVISION
INFO RHMSMVA/JGS
RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
RUMUFNA/CG IV CORPS
RUMUGKE/CNO VNN
RUMUSBA/DEPCOMNAVFORV
ZEN/OP BASE IAN CHAU
RHCYRB/YRBM TWO ONE
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

USDAO PHNOM DELIVER TO CDR FOURTH INFANTRY BRIGADE FOR ACTION
AND CAMBODIAN GENERAL STAFF FOR INFORMATION.

PAGE TWO RHMCSDR3038 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. (C) I EXTEND A PERSONAL WELL DONE TO ALL WHO ENSURED THE
SAFE PASSAGE OF CONVOY TP-12 TO PHNOM PENH IN SPITE OF A
CONCERTED EFFORT BY A DETERMINED ENEMY FOR ABOUT SIXTY HOURS
TO ATTACK THIS CONVOY.

SIGNED: REAR ADMIRAL MATTHEWS MEKONG CONVOY OPERATIONS COMMANDER.

GP-4

BT

3038

ZNR UUUUU

~~R 2500~~
FM COMNAVFORV

TO RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT SEVEN
RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT EIGHT
RHMCSDT/CTU ONE ONE SIX PT SEVEN PT FIVE
INFO RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX
RUMUJLO/SA FOUR FOUR SPECIAL ZONE

BT

UNCLAS

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FOR HOA BIEN OUTPOST

1. I AM EXTREMELY PROUD OF THE COURAGEOUS ACTIONS OF YOUR AIR
CREWS IN SUPPORT OF THE HOA BIEN OUTPOST UNDER ATTACK ON 23
MAY. THE COURAGE, PROFESSIONALISM, DEDICATION TO DUTY AND
AGGRESSIVENESS DISPLAYED BY THESE MEN IS INDEED GRATIFYING.
PLEASE EXPRESS MY PERSONAL WELL DONE TO EACH OF THEM. RADM
SALZER.

BT

3493

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PTTCZYUW RUMUGKA3254 1440502-CCCC-RUMUSBA
ZNY CCCCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FM COMNAVFORV
TO RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX
RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT SEVEN
RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT EIGHT
P 220800Z MAY 71

FM SA 44TH SIZ CAO LANH RVN
TO CO 164TH CAG CAN THO RVN
CO 82ND MDE DET BINH THUY RVN
CO NOC BINH THUY RVN
CG 1ST AVN DDE LONG BINH RVN
INFO CG DRAC CAN THO RVN
COMNAVFORV SAIGON RVN
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L//MACDRAC//50-02-097.

SUBJECT: RECOGNITION OF SUPPORT (U)

1. (C) ON THE MORNING OF 23 MAY 71, ELEMENTS OF SEAWOLVES, BLACK PONIES, COWBOYS, AND DUSTOFF FLEW IN SUPPORT OF THE ATTACK ON HOA BIEN OUTPOST, KIEN PHONG PROVINCE.
2. (C) YOUR PILOTS ACTIONS WERE EXEMPLARY IN EVERY RESPECT IN MY JUDGEMENT, HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THEIR COMPETENT, PROFESSIONAL SKILL AND DEDICATION THE OUTPOST WOULD HAVE BEEN OVERRUN.
3. (C) RECOMMEND THAT THE CREWS RECEIVE RECOGNITION. IF NECESSARY I WILL INITIATE SUCH ACTION IF YOU WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INFORMATION. PLEASE EXPRESS MY PERSONAL THANKS AND ADMIRATION TO EACH OF THE VALOROUS MEN OF YOUR GALLANT COMMAND WHO SUPPORTED THE HOA BIEN OUTPOST.

GP-4

BT

3254

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
FITOZYUW RHMCSAA0050 1091035-CCCC--RUMUSBA
ZNY CCCCC

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
FM CTF ONE ONE FIVE
TO GEN/NAVCOMMSTA CRB
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUMGKA/COMNAVPCRV
RUMGKE/CNO VNN
GEN/CTF TWO ONE THREE
RUMHQA/CINCPAC
RUMHBA/CINCPACFLT
RUMHMA/COMUSMACV
RUMHSA/COMNAVCOMM
RUMHGA/COMDT COGARD
RUMHGA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMPSAA/NAVCOMMSTAPHIL
RUMPTBB/USCGC RUSH
RUMPTBB/USCGC MORGENTHAU
GEN/USS ANTILOPE
RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX PT
RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT EIGHT
RUMRSAA/CTF SEVEN TWO

PAGE TWO RHMCSAA0060 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMWGA/CTG SEVEN TWO PT THREE
RUMPPA/CTU SEVEN TWO PT THREE PT SIX
RUMOSNA/CTU SEVEN TWO PT THREE PT FIVE
RUMRYA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SL-8-71 ENGAGEMENT

1. WITHOUT YOUR DEDICATED SUPPORT, THE SUCCESSFUL DESTRUCTION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SL-8 TRAWLER ON 12 APRIL 1971 WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE.

2. THROUGHOUT ALL PHASES OF THE OPERATION, YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND TIMELY RESPONSES ENABLED OPERATIONAL UNITS TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE, ENGAGE AND DESTROY THE ENEMY UPON ENTERING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, YOUR PERFORMANCE IS INDICATIVE OF THE FINE LEADERSHIP AND SUPERB STATE OF READINESS THAT IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO OUR COMBINED FORCES TO COMBAT AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL HANDS FOR A JOB WELL DONE. CAPT QUANSTROM SENDS.

GP-4

BT

0061

6
Enclosure (4)
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FM CTF SEVEN SEVEN
TO RUMFTBB/USCGC RUSH
RUMCSAA/USS ANTELOPE
RUMFTBB/USCGC MORGENTHAU
RUMUSBA/VAL-FOUR
RUMUPFA/CTU SEVEN TWO PT THREE PT SIX
INFO RUMUGKA/COMNAVFORV
RUMCSAA/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX
RUMMGA/CTG SEVEN TWO PT THREE
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

S-8 TRAWLER SINKING (U)

1. (C) THE COMBINATION OF TENACIOUS TRACKING, EXPEDITIOUS MARSHALLING OF FORECES AND COORDINATION OF A DEVASTATING AIR AND SURFACE ATTACK WHICH RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE S-8 TRAWLER ON 12 APRIL HAS EARNED ALL WHO PARTICIPATED OUR SINCERE ADMIRATION AND A HEARTY WELL DONE. THE ATTACK CARRIER STRIKING FORCE IS INDEED PROUD OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR BROTHERS IN ARMS. COOPER.

GP-4

BT

PRTCSYUW RUMUGKA 0092 1040603-CCCC-RUMUSBA.

ZNY CCCC

P 140635Z APR 71

FM COMNAVFORV

TO RUMCSAA/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMFTBB/USCGC RUSH

RUMCSAA/USS ANTELOPE

RUMFTBB/USCGC MORGENTHAU

RUMUSBA/CTF ONE ONE SIX

RUMUSBA/CTG ONE ONE SIX PT EIGHT

RUMUPFA/CTU SEVEN TWO PT THREE PT SIX

RUMERYA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMYRSAA/CTF SEVEN TWO

RUMMWGA/CTG SEVEN TWO PT THREE

P 131818Z APR 71

FM CNO

TO COMNAVFORV

CNO VNN

INFO CINCPACFLT

COMUSMACV

COMET COGARD

COMSEVENTHFLT

HEADQUARTERS
ADVISORY TEAM 51 (21ST DIVISION)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96402

MACDRAC-51-SA

23 September 1971

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

THRU: Commanding Officer
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

COMUSMACV
APO 96222

Commanding Officer
Naval Forces Vietnam

TO: Commanding Officer
Fleet Air Support
VAL-4, Binh Thuy
FPO 96627

1. Between 4 and 21 September 1971, the 21st ARVN Division was engaged with three NVA regiments in the U-Minh Forest in some of the heaviest fighting of the year. Black Ponies gave continuous support during this period. It is the best estimate of the advisory team that the "Ponies" killed more than 100 NVA during the fighting.

2. Most importantly, by providing close support (sometimes so within 25 meters of assaulting troops) as well as accurate support at night, the Ponies on several occasions permitted ARVN troops to overrun NVA positions before the enemy could withdraw or recover his weapons. As a result, at least five enemy battalions were decimated and over 200 weapons captured.

3. In over twenty seven months with US and ARVN combat units (to include service in all four corps areas) I know of no more professional, dedicated, or effective combat aviation unit in any service than the Black Ponies. Your often uncanny ability to hit the target under any conditions has resulted in your organization being the best known in the Delta.

Enclosure (4)

MACDRAC-51-SA

23 September 1971

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

4. Particularly impressive is your record in working with the ARVN. Your patience and ability to draw out necessary target information from the ARVN was frequently the key to success on the ground.

5. You should all be proud of the enviable reputation you have with the 21st ARVN Division and the essential role you have played in the U-Minh Campaign. I have noted that with ARVN commanders at all levels, if they know only two words in English, those words are "Black Pony".

6. I request the contents of this letter be made known to the members of your command and incorporated in their military records where appropriate.

/s/JOSEPH R. FRANKLIN
Colonel, Infantry
Senior Advisor

1

DOWNGRADING/DECLASSIFICATION ACTION

VAL-4 COMMAND HISTORY, CALENDAR YEAR 1971 (1 Jan 71-10 Apr 72)

The attached document is DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
with the exception(s) listed below:

enclosure 1 page 6 para 3a, 3b, and 3c remain confidential
enclosure 1 page 7 remains confidential
enclosure 1 page 8 remains confidential
enclosure 4 delete Date Time Groups of all messages.

DECLASSIFIED - ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
by OP - 09B91C DATE 25 October 1972

Signature: [Signature]

Billett: C

Date: 10/25/72