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From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam
To: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet (Code 12)

Subj: U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary; January 1969; submission of

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT ltr ser l/6925 of 2 October 1967

Encl: (1) Operation SEA LORDS Summary
(2) Coastal Surveillance Force Summary
(3) River Patrol Force Summary
(4) Riverine Assault Force Summary
(5) USN Statistical Summary
(6) Naval Advisory Group Summary
(7) VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary
(8) Psychological and Civic Action Operations
(9) USN Civic Action Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (9) are submitted.

2. The Data contained in enclosures (5), (7) and (9) is based on information available this date. Any adjustments to enclosures (5), (7) and (9) will be reflected in January's Historical Supplement.

J. P. Rizza
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
COMUSMACV (Hist. Branch, SJS)
CNO (Op-09B9LE)
Director of Naval History
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY
January 1969

The scope of Operation SEA LORDS was expanded again in early January as a new interdiction campaign, BARRIER REEF, was initiated to complete an interdiction line patrolled by U.S. Navy craft extending from Ha Tien on the Gulf of Thailand along the Cambodian border to Tay Ninh in III CTZ northwest of Saigon. An additional interdiction/pacification campaign continued in Kien Giang Province northeast of Rach Gia in the area bounded by the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen and Rach Soi canals. Mobile Riverine Group BRAVO operating with VNMC troops continued support of Operation SEA LORDS in Kien Giang, Chuong Thien and Phong Dinh provinces. These campaigns plus the numerous river/canal raids carried out in IV CTZ by coastal surveillance craft hit at enemy supply and base areas and crossed previously unpaired enemy supply routes. The actions resulted in high enemy personnel and material losses and provoked a strong enemy response of attacks on craft in all areas of operation.

Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT represents the longest and, during January, the most productive segment of the interdiction line. Extending from 5 miles southwest of Tay Ninh down the Vam Co Dong River to the Soi Rap south of Saigon and up the Vam Co Tay River to Moc Hoa 50 miles west of Saigon the GIANT SLINGSHOT campaign runs along and across enemy supply lines from the "Parrots' Beak" area of Cambodia into the western approaches to Saigon. Operations by river patrol and mobile riverine units with U.S. Army and Vietnamese ground forces were carried out on an almost daily basis on both
rivers. During January significant quantities of enemy supplies were discovered in 44 arms and rice caches near two rivers. Included in the material captured were:

- 188,000 rounds small arms ammunition
- 3,000 rounds heavy machine gun ammunition
- 3 122-mm rockets
- 355 B-40 rockets
- 361 RPG-2 rounds/boosters
- 678 recoiless rifle rounds (57-mm - 373, 75-mm - 305)
- 1,810 mortar rounds (60-mm - 949, 82-mm - 861)
- 2,000 pounds of explosives plus detonators, primacord, etc.
- 1,914 grenades (anti-tank, 40-mm, CHICOM, homemade, etc.)
- 313 mines, booby traps, bangalore torpedos, claymores, etc.
- 112 individual weapons
- 22 sampans plus 5 sampan motors
- 55 miscellaneous clothing, personal equipment, camp gear and medical caches
- 31,000 pounds rice

These results were not achieved without cost as patrol units encountered hostile fire 68 times (including 4 booby traps) during GIANT SLINGSHOT operations. Losses included 8 USN, 1 USA, and 15 Vietnamese (ARVN, VNN, RF/PF, CIDG) killed in action; 2 USA missing in action; 51 USN, 24 USA, and 13 Vietnamese wounded in action; 23 craft damaged and 2 PBR's sunk. During river bank sweeps by ground forces, while taking 26 evading junks and sampans under fire or suppressing hostile fire GIANT SLINGSHOT forces killed 70 enemy (50 body count plus 20 probable), wounded an estimated 9 others, captured 20, detained 25 suspects, received one Hoi Chanh, and destroyed 228 structures and 49 junks or sampans.

The BARRIER REEF campaign extends from GIANT SLINGSHOT operations on the Vam Co Tay along the Kinh Lagrange from Tuyen Nhon to Ap Bac and westward along the Kinh Ong Lon to the upper Mekong River at An Long. Patrol operations commencing on 2 January contributed to an important enemy defeat
when the presence of patrol units supporting a PF ambush team 18 miles east of An Long twice turned back a heavy weapons company attempting to cross the canal on its way from Cambodia to the area west of Sa Dec. The company was spotted by a visual reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of the 14th and most of its members were killed by gunship strikes or were captured by the PF unit. Other enemy losses to patrol craft or ground forces operating with patrols included 12 killed (6 body count plus 6 probable), 10 captured, 2 suspects detained, and 1 small arms cache discovered. As with GIANT SLINGSHOT, the enemy reaction to these patrols - six hostile fire incidents including the mining of two PBR's, indicated to some extent how this interdiction campaign is hampering enemy logistics. Friendly losses in these actions came to 4 USN killed in action, 16 USN and 1 Vietnamese wounded, 2 patrol craft damaged, 2 craft sunk/beached, and 1 helicopter shot down (later recovered). Chain drag mine sweeping operations by ASPB's were commenced late in January to meet the enemy mine threat.

The Rach Giang Thanh and Vinh Te Canal patrol campaigns complete the SEA LORDS interdiction line along the Cambodian border. Although the PCP/ATC operations met with hostile fire only once with no casualties during January, the mining of a PBR on 22 January near the entrance of the Vinh Te Canal wounded 4 crewmen and sank the patrol craft. The seriousness of the mine threat led to the suspension of patrols until the 28th when chain drag sweep operations by VNN LCVP's were commenced. Defoliation operations were carried out along Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal and Rach Giang Thanh by units of
Mobile Riverine Group BRAVO early in the month. However, non-concurrence of local officials delayed defoliation along the Vinh Te Canal, increasing the threat of enemy initiated action along the canal banks.

Operations in the Rach Gia campaign continued to meet intermittent enemy opposition including the mining of an ASPB. Patrols by PBR/ASPB were taken under hostile fire six times during January resulting in four VNN killed, one USN and three RF/PF wounded, two craft damaged (one VNN craft), and one patrol boat sunk. Patrol operations and operations with RF/PF troops discovered one arms cache of 124 mortar rounds (60-mm – 180, 120-mm – 4) and 2100 rounds of small arms ammunition in addition to killing two Viet Cong and detaining nine suspects. Operations along the Can Gao Canal by Mobile Riverine Group BRAVO early in January met heavy enemy fire on four occasions 18 to 22 miles southwest of Rach Gia. A week of mobile riverine operation southeast of Rach Gia along the Cai Lon River also encountered heavy enemy opposition with eight fire fights and one ATC sunk by a mine on the 14th. After three days of operations with light contact and two hostile fire incidents 9 miles southeast of Can Tho, units of Mobile Riverine Group BRAVO returned to the Rach Gia area for a week of operations with the VNMC on the 22nd. Here light contact was gained in an area 6 to 14 miles north east of Rach Gia. At the month’s end operations were commenced along the Can Tho River in Phong Dinh Province. Statistics for the month’s mobile riverine operations in support of Operation SEA LORDS included:

Enclosure (1)
Enemy casualties:

a. Killed 25 (BC)
b. Captured 4
c. Suspects detained 14

Friendly casualties:

a. Killed 11 (11 VNMC)
b. Wounded 138 (42 USN, 85 VNMC, 6 VNN and 5 RF/PF)
c. Captured 0
d. Missing 2 (2 USN)

Enemy material losses:

a. Destroyed
   (1) Junk or sampans 0
   (2) Structures 14
b. Captured (5 arms caches discovered)
   (1) 12 individual weapons
   (2) 6 mortar rounds (60-mm)
   (3) 5 B-41 and 12 B-40 rounds
   (4) 12 rounds 57-mm recoilless rifle ammunition
   (5) 290 grenades and 22 mines plus miscellaneous components

Friendly material losses:

a. Craft damaged 13 (10 USN, 3 VNN)
b. Craft destroyed 1 (1 ATC)

During January Operation SEA LORDS river incursions by coastal surveillance craft reached a high level of 62 operations and penetrated deeper into enemy dominated areas than ever before. "Swift" boats were busy with mortars and machine guns many miles from the coast from a few miles south of Saigon in the Rung Sat Special Zone to the Cambodian border. Included in the 62 operations are two river incursions by VNN "Swift" boats. Results of these operations and the 30 encounters with hostile fire are as follows:
Enemy casualties:

a. Killed 37 (BC)+31 (EST) - includes 10 (BC) by supporting LHFT
b. Wounded 15 (EST)
c. Suspects detained 42

Friendly casualties:

a. Killed 18 (2 USN=1 TF 115, 1 NAG and 16 RF)
b. Wounded 19 (17 USN and 2 RF)

Enemy material losses:

a. Destroyed
   (1) Junk or sampans 632
   (2) Structures 633
b. Damaged
   (1) Junk or sampans 187
   (2) Structures 612
c. Captured
   (1) Junk or sampans 4

Friendly material losses:

a. Craft damaged 13 (12 TF 115 and 1 VNN)
b. Craft destroyed 1 (1 VNN junk)
A slight increase in total detections of junk and sampans to 51,071 followed the normal seasonal pattern of coastal activity. The percentage of craft detected which were checked by visual inspections or boarding and search remained at the high level of 74 percent reached in December. Operation MARKET TIME surveillance units inspected 24,120 and boarded 13,799 junk and sampans. As a result of the boardings a total of 1,679 persons were detained for curfew or restricted area violations, improper papers, suspected draft dodging or desertion, and other suspicious activity. No suspicious activity was noted during the 914 inspections and 53 boardings carried out to check 1,245 detections of steel-hulled vessels. As in December a number of Swift boats operated under the operational control of CTF 116 on the Soi Rap and during January 2,917 craft were detected with 1,140 inspections and 1,193 boardings being carried out by these river patrols. In addition, Swift boats under CTF 115 operational control continued patrols on approximately 70 miles of the lower Ham Luong and Go Chien rivers in order to release TF 116 PBR's for Operation SEA LORDS employment.

River incursions into the Ca Mau Peninsula under Operation SEA LORDS continued to dominate the offensive operations carried out by Coastal Surveillance Force units as 60 river/canal operations and several naval gunfire support missions by Swift boat river patrols were carried out during January. In addition, two Swift boats supported by a Mobile Riverine Force

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
ATC continued daily patrol operations on the Bach Giang Thanh along the Cambodian border as part of the Operation SEA LORDS interdiction campaign in that area. Of 54 hostile fire incidents recorded in January, 30 involved craft operating on inland waterways resulting in one USN killed, 19 wounded and 12 Swift boats damaged. An additional four USN were wounded as a landing team from two Swift boats was taken under fire while sweeping an area east of Phan Rang. Enemy losses to naval gunfire by MARKET TIME craft during the river/canal operations and 928 additional gunfire support missions totaled 1,579 junks/sampans/structures/bunkers destroyed plus 1,134 heavily damaged, 154 killed (94 body count plus 60 probable), and 60 wounded.

During the morning of 3 January PCF 13 carried out an effective psyops mission off the coast near two enemy controlled villages 25 miles northwest of Chu Lai. After an hour of loudspeaker operations approximately 150 Vietnamese civilians had gathered on the beach for escort to a refugee village. As the escort operation by PCF's 13 and 69 commenced an enemy ambush killed 10 and wounded five of the refugees as they moved from their village. The Swift boats called in Americal Division gunships to suppress the enemy fire as the Vietnamese interpreter on PCF 13 told the refugees help was on the way and sang them songs to prevent panic. By the end of the day more than 200 people had relocated, despite Viet Cong threats of death for doing so, in order to escape enemy exploitation of their food and labor.
Although nearly all of the river operations represent significant incidents in the month's activity, two stand out. One for the size of forces employed and the other for extending the operations into new areas. On 15 January the enemy bunkers which have frequently been the source of intense hostile fire 2 miles up the Bo De River 50 miles south of Ca Mau were dealt a final blow. A force consisting of 10 PCF's, EOD/UDT personnel and mobile strike force troops supported by two WPB's and an LST moved up the river under both LHPT and fixed wing air cover. Following air strikes on the bunker complex demolition teams and security troops were landed unopposed to destroy the enemy positions. During the day's operations 74 bunkers, 17 huts, 11 structures, 20 sampans and a footbridge were destroyed with another six bunkers damaged. The second unique river incursion took place on the 28th when four Swift boats carried out a six-hour operation that took them more than 40 miles across the Ca Mau Peninsula. Entering the Ganh Hao River 23 miles east-southeast of Ca Mau the PCF's proceeded up river all the way to Ca Mau taking targets of opportunity under fire along the way. From Ca Mau the four Swift craft made their way to the Gulf of Thailand via the Ong Doc River receiving hostile fire at one point which disabled the engines of one PCF. The Swift boat was towed the remainder of the journey out the river, however, no casualties were received during the engagement. Enemy losses came to 70 sampans, 25 structures, two bunkers, and a fish trap destroyed plus 14 sampans, 62 structures, and two bunkers damaged.
This month, the river patrol force increased its pressure on the enemy by a further extension of its area of operations. In addition to continued patrol of the main rivers of the Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone and its participation in the ongoing campaigns of Operations SEA LORDS, e.g. Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, Vinh Te Canal Campaign and Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal campaign, on 2 January PBR's joined with other U. S. forces in Operation BARRIER REEF. Operation BARRIER REEF involved the expansion of the GIANT SLINGSHOT along Kinh Lagrange and Kinh Ong Lon from Tuyen Nhon to Dinh Dien Phuoc Xuyen. In addition the area of responsibility of CTG 116.5 was expanded to include the same canal from An Long to Chuoc Xuyen.

Units of TG 116.7 participated in a cordon and search operation on Cu Lao Giai Island in the Co Chien River, from the morning of 6 January until midnight of 7 January. This campaign was initiated to interrupt the enemy commo/laison routes across the southern tip of the island through the use of stringent blockade and ground sweeps. During the middle part of the month, units of TG 116.9 joined with elements of the U. S. 25th Division in Operation MISSISSIPPI on the upper Saigon River about 10-28 miles north of the capital. PBR's during this operation were used primarily as daylight troop carriers.

The enemy has not taken kindly to the presence of U. S. forces in his former havens. Intelligence reports continually alluded to the enemy...
intention to increase his mining efforts. Mining incidents became a particular problem along the Vinh Te Canal and Barrier Reef.

There were five incidents of enemy attacks on commercial shipping on the Long Tau River during the month. Three of these incidents occurred on 3 January. The Italian ship RAPIDO received rocket rounds from both sides of the river 25 miles southeast of Saigon at 1220. At 1300, ten miles southeast of Saigon two rocket rounds landed between the ESSO BANGKOK and the CAPE TOWN MARU. The OVERSEAS ROSE received rocket rounds from both banks of the river, 14 miles southeast of Saigon at 1545. There were no hits or casualties in any of these attacks. Return fire by PBR's during the OVERSEAS ROSE incident resulted in secondary explosions. During the morning of 11 January the SS ANGKOR and the SS CRUSTACIA were subjected to a rocket and small arms attack, 22 miles southeast of Saigon. One rocket hit the ANGKOR causing light damage but no casualties. The MSTS ship LYNFIELD VICTORY was attacked on the morning of 12 January with no hits or casualties.

The enemy continued to avoid any large scale unit contact during the month and relied on attack by fire, harassment and terrorists/sapper activity which increased in frequency as the month progressed. This is attributable in part to the disruptive effect that naval units have caused to his re-supply and infiltration timetable and his need to "save face" in those areas which he previously considered his own. The period around Tet (16-18 February) is commonly mentioned in captured documents as the likely start of the enemy winter-spring offensive, although as a result of his stepped up attacks during the latter part of the third week in January he may already
have started his offensive in the western portion of the III CTZ.

On the night of 2 January, PBR's of TU 116.3.3 provided a blocking force for a combined Go Cong PRU/National Police Field Force sweep of a Viet Cong controlled village, 7 miles northwest of Co Cong. PBR's received small arms fire once but did not return the fire due to the presence of friendlies in the area. They later took one evader under fire and reported a probable kill. The results of the ground sweep were five Viet Cong killed, nine Viet Cong captured and 65 suspects detained of which 46 were confirmed as Viet Cong infrastructure as a result of interrogation.

Just after 2000 on 15 January, PBR's 302 and 303 were proceeding to a patrol area after inserting a PRU unit, when they encountered nine sampans about 14 miles northwest of Vung Tau. The sampans were hailed and illuminated but failed to stop. The evading boats were taken under fire by the PBR's. A Navy LHPT, an Air Force O2 from 19TH TASC stationed at Tan Son Nhat and an unknown PCF provided illumination while the PBR's and Phu's checked out the contact area. Results of the encounter were five definite Viet Cong killed and five probable and three Viet Cong sympathizers captured. There were no friendly casualties.

Two PBR's on patrol of the Vam Co Dong, 23 miles west of Phu Cong, came under heavy automatic weapons and rocket fire on the evening of 17 January. PBR 716 received two rocket hits below the waterline and had to be abandoned. PBR 721 picked up the crew of the abandoned boat and
cleared the area to the north. PBR's of TU 194.9.4 approaching the area from the north to search for the boat came under fire while enroute, and after returning fire retired to the south. An Army LHFT placed strikes on both enemy positions. This was followed by artillery fire spotted by an Army aerial observer. PBR 721 was subsequently escorted through the area by TU 194.9.4. Enemy casualties were unknown, U.S. casualties were three wounded. The next evening during salvage operations, TU 194.9.4 received fire just south of the salvage area. They proceeded north where PBR's of TU 194.9.1 were conducting the salvage operation. As aid was being given to one of the sailors wounded in the attack, the eight man security perimeter on the beach came under automatic weapons fire and ground assault by an estimated 30 Viet Cong. The fire was returned and three Viet Cong were killed. The security perimeter was safely extracted and the boats cleared to the north. An Army LHFT in the area observed the firing and expended his ordnance load on the enemy positions. Artillery was subsequently called in and spotted by the LHFT. Ten additional Viet Cong were killed as a result of the LHFT strikes.

During the evening of 17 January, reacting on intelligence from the Senior Advisor Sa Dec Sector, SEALs with a Hoi Chanh as guide where inserted by a PBR 5 miles southeast of Sa Dec in an attempt to locate a possible weapons cache. At the first insertion point PBR's and SEALs received moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire. The PBR's suppressed the fire, and then proceeded approximately 200 yards further and inserted the SEALs,
Seawolves were scrambled to provide overhead cover for the SEALs, and the PBR's took up positions for possible fire support. The SEALs uncovered a major medical supply cache valued at roughly $7000. Seawolves flew the cache to Sa Dec and the SEALs were extracted by a PBR without incident. There were no U.S. casualties.

Operating in the RSSZ on the evening of 17 January about 4 miles south-east of Nha Be, PBR's and PRU's killed the seven occupants of two sampans. The PRU reported one of the sampans had been towing an object and requested to be re-inserted. The PBR's returned with LHFT overhead and found the object in question which was six feet long and a foot and a half across. Noises from the banks caused the units to retire from the scene temporarily. After boarding additional PRU's and EOD personnel at Nha Be, they again closed the area and located the suspect object. The EOD officer evaluated it as a mine and requested and received permission to take it back to Nha Be for disarming. The PBR's arrived back at Nha Be at 2330 and the mine was brought ashore and disarming began. At 23:45 the mine exploded causing the following casualties: 3 USN killed, 6 USN wounded seriously and 12 USN wounded slightly.

TU 116.5.4 (four PBR's, one ATC) on a BARRIER REEF WEST patrol, about 8 miles west of Dinh Dien Phuoc Xuyen, received heavy rocket, small arms, and automatic weapons fire from both banks of the canal at 2200, 20 January. One of the PBR's was sunk but it's crew was recovered by the cover
boat. Seawolves were scrambled and upon arrival one of them was shot down. The remaining Seawolf rescued the crew of the downed aircraft. One hundred to two hundred Viet Cong were observed to be advancing in the area of the downed helo. "Spooky" aircraft and an additional LHFT arrived on the scene to cover the sunk boat and downed helo. ASPB's arrived and after effecting emergency repairs took the sunken PBR under tow. The ASPB's also coordinated all MEDEVACS. U.S. casualties were one killed and 11 wounded (four on helo). Enemy losses are unknown.

The cover boat of TU 116.5.2 was mined on the Vinh Te Canal, 7 1/2 miles SW of Chau Doc, on the morning of 22 January. The PBR suffered extensive hull and engineering damage and four crewmen were wounded. The wounded were MEDEVACED to Chau Doc. The hulk of the PBR was subsequently refloated and towed to YRBM-16 for repairs. The mine was evaluated to have been a command detonated moored type.

Shortly after 2030 on 31 January, the 5th Special Forces Group initiated contact, 16 miles southeast of Saigon, with the point element of what was estimated to be a reinforced enemy company which was moving east to west in two files on each side of a road. Claymores were blown and the enemy returned the fire. At 2054 a Navy LHFT from TU 116.9.8 was vectored to the area and conducted a rocket and strafing run on the enemy positions, surprising two enemy squads as they attempted to cut off the friendly ambush withdrawing to its base camp. The LHFT continued to strafe enemy troops in the open along the road. After firing ceased, the area was illuminated and U.S.
forces counted 27 of the enemy killed during the attack.

During this reporting period GAME WARDEN units detected 171,446 watercraft and conducted 37,693 inspections and 70,923 boardings. This is an approximate decrease of 10 percent over last month's totals. U.S. casualties for TF 116 during the period were 10 killed (3 DOW) and 69 wounded.
RIVERINE ASSAULT FORCE SUMMARY
January 1969

During January, Mobile Riverine Force units sought out and engaged
the enemy throughout the Delta region. Offensive operations consisted
of frequent applications of small unit force over wide areas. This
strategy is intended to have major effect toward the breakup of com-
munist infrastructure, enhancement of pacification, disruption of enemy
plans, and the demoralization of enemy forces.

The activities of MRG ALPHA remained essentially stable as troop lift
operations were continued mainly in Kien Hoa Province in support of the
2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry. Constant pressure is being applied to enemy
forces there in advancement of the accelerated pacification effort.
Attrition against enemy forces was again significant, yielding a daily
average of 14 Viet Cong killed. MRG BRAVO, operating mainly with the
3rd and 4th Battalions, Vietnamese Marine Corps, advanced into Chuong
Thien, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, and northern Ba Xuyen provinces. Detached
units of the MRF conducted coordinated operations in the northern Delta
as components of Operation SEA LORDS campaigns. Troops aboard these units
have discovered large quantities of enemy weapons and supplies cached
along river banks.

The following table of MRF boat assignments provides an overview of the
diversity of MRF activity during a typical day in January:

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
**ACTIVITY/OPERATION** | **MRF CRAFT ASSIGNED**
--- | ---
2nd Brigade, U. S. 9th Infantry (MRG "A") | ASPB 9 ATC 32+2Z MON 4 CCB 2 REFUELER 1
2nd Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps (MRG "B") | 2 23 7 2
Operation Giant SLINGSHOT | 10 11 2 2 1
Task Unit 116.5.4 (Barrier Reef west) | 2 2
Task Group 116.9 (Rung Sat) | 3 1
VNN Training (RAD 91) | 8 13 3 1
MRB "A" Base Defense | 6 12 3 1 1
MRB "B" Base Defense | 7 2 1 1
Task Group 115.4 | 1
Casualty report | 1
Overhaul/Conversion/Backfit | 3 4 1

**TOTAL** 48 103 20 10 4

Task force organizational changes to CTF 117 Operation Order 201-YR were promulgated on 15 January as follows:

1. TU 117.2.3 became TU 117.1.5
2. TE 117.2.3.1 became TE 117.1.5.1
3. TE 117.2.3.2 became TE 117.1.5.2

**MOBILE RIVERINE GROUP ALPHA OPERATIONS**

Operation WATER TRAP, a major cordon and search operation of Thoi Son Island, in the My Tho River south of Dong Tam, was begun on 4 January.
Twenty-four river assault craft of RAD's 92 and 111, two U.S. infantry battalions, eight PBR's and Vietnamese units participated in this operation which was targeted against Viet Cong guerrilla and swimmer/sapper units located on the eastern end of the island. The island population was temporarily located to three collection points, people were screened by Vietnamese National Police, issued new I.D. cards, and exposed to Civic Action Programs. Meanwhile, river craft assumed blocking stations and the island was swept by infantry units seeking Viet Cong. A total of 1,353 people were gathered at the three collection points, and 70 Viet Cong were apprehended as the operation ended on 7 January.

Rotation of River Assault Division assignments took place during the month. On 12 January, boats of RAD 91 assumed a stand down status preliminary to the planned turnover of 25 river assault craft to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 February. VNN personnel aboard RAD 91 units have undergone on-the-job training since early December. RAS 13 joined MRG ALPHA and RAD 132 was relieved by RAD 92 as the assault force of Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. RAD 132 returned to the Mobile Riverine Base and supported the 4/47th Infantry Battalion. RAD 131 assumed utility duties and supported the 3/34th Artillery Battalion, RAD 112 assumed support duties for the 3/60th Infantry Battalion and RAD 111 came off the line and assumed base defense duties.

On 10 January, at 2332, units of MRG ALPHA went to General Quarters as a mortar attack was launched against Dong Tam base from the south
bank of the My Tho River. Although none of the ships were hit, 6 Army men were wounded and 10 helos at Dong Tam were damaged. MEB ships and Army artillery returned and suppressed the enemy fire.

MOBILE RIVERINE GROUP BRAVO OPERATIONS

Reconnaissance operations in enemy base area 483 in southern Kien Giang Province, begun on 26 December, continued into January. Eighteen river assault craft of RAS 15, working in coordination with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, Vietnamese Marine Corps, conducted patrol and troop landing activity along the Can Cao Canal. Ground contact with enemy forces was sporadic throughout the campaign which lasted until 7 January. Despite intelligence reports of significant enemy forces in the area, contact with friendly forces was avoided as the enemy employed hit and run tactics. On 1 January at 1745 an enemy initiated firefight took a heavy toll among troops and sailors aboard assault craft. Three of the river boats took B-40 rocket and automatic weapons hits, resulting in 11 USN and 37 Vietnamese Marines wounded and one Vietnamese Marine killed. The assault craft immediately returned and suppressed the enemy fire with unknown results. Two similar enemy attacks had taken place in approximately the same area along the canal on 31 December.

River Assault Squadron 15, consisting of 17 ATC's, six monitors, one CCB, 2 ASPB's and one LCM-6 (flame charging unit) with 2nd Battalion Vietnamese troops embarked began find, fix and destroy operations along the Song Cai Tu and Song Cai Lon rivers in enemy base area 480 on the
morning of 11 January. The operation was planned in order to interdict
enemy forces suspected to be in the region; they had been using base area
480 as a staging and storage locale for the conduct of offensive operations
in Chuong Tien, Kien Giang and Phong Dinh provinces. Numerous troop
insertions along beaches took place although contact with enemy ground
forces above squad size did not occur. After troop landings, river assault
craft established blocking and interdiction stations and checked a total
of 189 sampans throughout the operation which lasted until 18 January.
Nine Viet Cong suspects were detained. Enemy attempts to repulse the
riverine forces took form as eight enemy initiated firefight resulted.
Of the total of 26 USN wounded, five occurred as ATC-151-5 was sunk by a
watermine on the Song Cai Tu 5½ miles southwest of Vi Thanh while river
assault craft were proceeding to refueling stations at Vi Thanh. Two
sailors and one Vietnamese Marine were killed as the mined craft sank
almost immediately. During the operation, in which at least 18 Viet
Cong were killed, several arms caches were discovered.
### USN Statistical Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>GAME WARDEN</th>
<th>Mobile Riverine Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detections</td>
<td>55,233*</td>
<td>171,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>26,174*</td>
<td>37,693</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boardings</td>
<td>15,050*</td>
<td>70,923</td>
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<tr>
<td>Craft detained</td>
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<td>Persons detained</td>
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<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile fire incidents</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enemy Casualties:**
- **Killed:** 94(BC)+60(EST) + 101(BC)+68(EST) = 437
- **Wounded:** 62 + 15(BC)+ 5(EST) = 1
- **Captured:** 2 + 17 = 85

**USN Casualties:**
- **Killed:** 1 + 10(3 DOW) = 3
- **Wounded:** 27*** + 69 = 81

**Enemy Material Losses:**
- **Destroyed:**
  1. Junks or sampans: 835 + 161 = 20
  2. Structures: 744 + 233 = 1,136
- **Captured:**
  1. Junks or sampans: 2 + 18 = **
  2. Weapons: 0 + (See Page Two) = 393
  3. Ammunition (rounds): 0 + 543 = 543
  4. Rice (tons): 0 + 21
- **Damaged:**
  1. Junks or sampans: 242 + 83 = **
  2. Structures: 892 + 185 = **

**USN Material Losses:**
- **Destroyed:**
  1. Surface craft: 0 + 1 = 1
  2. Helicopters: 0 + 0 = 0
- **Damaged:**
  1. Surface craft: 12 + 21 = 27****
  2. Helicopters: 0 + 6 = 0

**SAR missions:** 1 + 0 = 0

**Remarks:**
- * Includes surveillance results of PCF operations on Soi Rap under opcon CTF 116.
- ** Not available
- *** Includes 1 USN WIA by friendly ordnance malfunctions.
- **** Includes WIA on MRF craft in SEA LORDS operations.
- ***** Includes all categories of damage—very light to substantial.
### TF 116 CAPTURED WEAPONS/AMMUNITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Individual weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>Grenades (CHICOM, M-26, M-25, Frag, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>122mm Mortar rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>60mm Mortar rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279</td>
<td>82mm Mortar rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>B-40 Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Land/anti-tank mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>RPG Boosters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>75mm Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>57mm Recoilless rifle rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>AK-47 Clips</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68,261</td>
<td>Small arms rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Heavy machinegun rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804</td>
<td>Pounds of C-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>736</td>
<td>Pounds of unnamed explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Booby trap fuzes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Feet of primer cord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rolls of time fuze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Battery packs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TF 116 CAPTURED RICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>Pounds captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½</td>
<td>Tons destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The VNN's Fleet Command ships, coastal group junks and riverine assault group armored craft experienced a relatively routine month in January as they pursued their daily objectives. The newly acquired VNN assets however, the PBR's and the PCF's, underwent diverse and active participation in operations, especially in actions which were offensive in nature. These small modern boats recorded even greater activity this month as compared to previous months as the boats and their crews developed increased proficiency and self-sufficiency. RPG 51, the VNN's 12 operating PBR's, assumed still another area of responsibility in January as four PBR's commenced two-day patrols of the Long Tau River on 8 January. This new patrol area for the VNN PBR's is in addition to the two-day and three-night patrols which are being conducted on the Saigon and Dong Nai rivers and enables the U. S. Navy TF 116 PBR's, formerly tasked with the Long Tau patrols, to be assigned elsewhere in the Delta.

Shortly after midnight on 24 January, an RPG 51 PBR was performing routine patrols on the Dong Nai River when four enemy sampans were sighted exiting an adjacent canal. The VNN sailors took the sampans under fire sinking one sampan; Viet Cong observed on the river banks were also taken under fire. Army Spooky aircraft and LHFT's were called in for air support as the PBR's inserted an Army LRRP for follow-up ground sweeps. The area was found to be heavily booby trapped. At first light further searches of the area uncovered substantial amounts of enemy war materials including...
weapons, ammunition, tools, kerosene, medical supplies, cooking equipment and clothing. VNN divers recovered the sunken sampan and most of its contents which included additional weapons, ammunition, documents, clothing and rice. Four of the enemy were killed by body count while 10-15 additional Viet Cong were estimated to have been brought down by the PBR's initial shore bombardment and subsequent air strikes.

The Phu Quoc Island based VNN PCF's experienced increased enemy activity this month as they performed more offensive operations. On 9 January the prompt reaction of a VNN PCF prevented one of the government's experimental New Life hamlets from being overrun. An urgent call for gunfire support from the hamlet on Phu Quoc Island was received by a patrolling PCF and the VNN Swift boat raced to a point off shore and began shelling the Viet Cong position. The U. S. advisor on board reported that the crewmen had to fire over a hill at an unseen enemy in close proximity to a village. A U. S. Army advisor in the village described the shooting as "excellent" and credited the PCF with successfully routing the enemy attack.

On the night of 22 January during one of the first SEA LORDS missions in which VNN PCF's experienced enemy activity, the USN advisor of a PCF, MM2 A. L. KROKOW, USN, was lost overboard and presumed dead. The action took place on the Cai Lon River as two VNN PCF's were participating in a SEA LORDS operation with USN and USA elements in Kien Giang Province. One PCF received B-40 hits directed from the west bank of the river. Both PCF's retaliated with 50 caliber, M-79 and M-16 fire which effectively
silenced the enemy. The advisor had been hit by shrapnel and concussion from a B-40 rocket, he fell into the river and was immediately swallowed up by the black waters. Subsequent attempts to retrieve the body by a combined force of U. S. MARKET TIME PCF's, Army air cover and VNN Coastal Group 43/44 reaction units failed.

For the month of January the USMC advisors reported light to scattered action as the VNMC conducted operations in the III and IV CTZ. Brigade "A", VNMC, was composed of the 1st and 5th Infantry battalions and remained in a reserve status at their base camps at Thu Duc on standby to the Joint General Staff until 15 January. The 4th Battalion stood down also at Thu Duc until 7 January when it relieved the 3rd Battalion in IV CTZ. The 1st and 5th battalions activated in III CTZ from 15 through 18 January conducting reconnaissance in force operations under the operational control of the III CTZ Commander. On 18 January the 1st Battalion relocated to Tay Ninh and joined the 6th Battalion which had been operating independently in the vicinity since December under the operational control of the ARVN 25th Infantry Division. For the remainder of the month the Brigade pursued the enemy in that northern III CTZ city in concert with ARVN and USA troops and encountered minimal enemy resistance.

Meanwhile Brigade "B", the 2nd and 3rd battalions, until 7 January when the 4th Battalion replaced the 3rd Battalion, continued riverine operations in Kien Giang and Chuong Thien provinces in IV CTZ under the operational control of the ARVN 21st Infantry Division and in close coordination with
units of the U. S. MRF. Light to moderate enemy activity was experienced as the marines participated in the combined offensive riverine operations to interdict enemy movement in the Delta.
VIETNAMESE NAVY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COASTAL FORCE</th>
<th>Daily Average</th>
<th>Searched</th>
<th>Detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>Empl</td>
<td>Junks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>21,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>28,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>10,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>9,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Total: 70,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FLEET COMMAND PATROL SHIPS* 38.1 | 31.7 | 3,652 | 13,170 | 5 | 12 |

**RIVERINE AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRAFT</th>
<th>Daily Average</th>
<th>Searched</th>
<th>Detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>Empl</td>
<td>Junks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120.5</td>
<td>116.8</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>31,060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**#GEN RESERVE FORCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oper</th>
<th>Empl</th>
<th>Junks</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Totals: 96,926</th>
<th>285,382</th>
<th>113</th>
<th>720</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>8,149</td>
<td>20,550</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS:**

VC/NVA: KIA 52, Captured 30, Suspects detained 81

VNMC: KIA 27, WIA 185

USMC: WIA 2

* Provided 77 gunfire support missions.

# Includes RAG 27, RTEG and RPG 51.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CIVIC ACTION OPERATIONS

Loudspeaker broadcasts during the month totaled 1000 hours. The value of this program may best be seen from the following situations:

On 8 January two Hoi Chanhs rallied to PBR's on routine patrol from a water taxi. They rallied as a result of being contacted by a PRU intelligence agent and the PBR PSYOPS broadcasts. Both of these men were from Binh Ninh village and they stated that more VC/VCI would rally from the area but were afraid that the PBR's would shoot them. The Hoi Chanhs then taped a statement emphasizing that prospective Hoi Chanh should not fear to rally, that the procedure was uncomplicated, and that families were welcome to rally to the PBR's. These men rallied at 0740 and by 1930 the tape they had made was being played in the area of their home village. At the end of the month this tape was updated with information naming local VC and the positions they held in an attempt to induce them to Chieu Hoi or quit their posts. The enemy's reaction to the original tape was not long in coming. On 9 January while the PBR patrol was broadcasting the tape, it came under heavy automatic weapons fire.

In another area, the First Coastal Zone, two Hoi Chanhs rallied to Coastal Group 14. Their reason for rallying was dissatisfaction with the communist regime. They had heard Chieu Hoi broadcasts from VNN junk's and aircraft. In fact when asked if they had heard any airborne broadcasts, one of them repeated one of the PSYOPS tapes word for word. Their reason for choosing Coastal Group 14 as a rallying point was the result of the
regular Chieu Hoi broadcasts from the junks in the river. The ralliers also reported that many people in the area desired to rally as their morale was low. Fear was their biggest factor plus the fact that VC units were drafting 15-year olds.

CTG 116.1 involvement in building a house for the survivors of a victim of a patrol accident showed the villagers at An Hoa that U.S. forces were willing to help them in time of need. As a consequence of this civic action, several intelligence reports of confirmed accuracy have been received from An Hoa villagers.

January saw a total of 24 Hoi Chanhs rally to naval forces, also during this period 35,000 persons were treated at MEDCAPS.
USN CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
January 1969

TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS: 4,500

COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS: VN$ 5,500,000

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS: VN$ 900,000

PERCENTAGE OF U. S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other FWMAF</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. civilian voluntary agencies</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average percent of self-help by VN civilians</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Man Days</th>
<th>Expenditures (VN$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INSTITUTES ASSISTED:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Dispensaries</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphanages</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>